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Summary  findings
After surveying the facts and distilling the voluminous  deficit need not be eliminated, but the link between
literature  on the transition to market economies,  deficits and money growth must be severed.
Wyplosz arrives at several conclusions:  *  Structural reform is important,  and microeconomic
With hindsight, the old debate - Big Bang versus  policies, often overlooked, should be started as soon as
gradualism - was really a problem of feasibility,  possible. This means establishing property rights,
although many of the arguments in favor of the Big Bang  hardening budget constraints, building a healthy banking
have now been proven right.  system, and ensuring true domestic competition.
Once more, inflation has been found to be  * The choice of an exchange rate regime, another early
incompatible with growth and the importance of a good  controversy, is apparently less important than adherence
microeconomic structure - especially an effective  to a strict monetary policy. The floaters have tightly
banking system - has been confirmed.  managed their exchange rates, while the fixers have
The decline of the state in transition economies is both  repeatedly devalued and have often ended up floating.
spectacular and puzzling - combining features that are  Some form of monetary targeting is needed, but it
both desirable and dangerous.  matters little which target is chosen so long as it is
Among useful lessons learned:  adhered to.
* It has paid to start early and move fast. The Big Bang  - Creating irreversibilities early on allows governments
is highly desirable but impractical, and gradualism is  to change without seriously affecting the transition. The
unavoidable but ought to be compressed as much as  less stable the economy, the more politics matters. A
possible. The countries that bit the bullet early and hard  shaky economic basis is fertile ground for policy reversals
have done better over the past decade.  that set the clock back several years (Bulgaria, Romania,
* Stabilize first; grow next. Macroeconomic  Russia).
stabilization is a prerequisite for growth. The budget
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Abstract: Transition was never going to be easy, even if the long-run outlook is
highly promising.  Not only was the process itself a major theoretical  and policy
challenge but, inevitably, politics and economics  were bound to interfere. With some
spectacular  exceptions, most countries  are now on the right track. With hindsight, the
old debate, Big Bang vs. gradualism,  is more a question of feasibility even  though
many of the arguments  in favor of Big Bang have now been proven right. Once more
inflation has been found to be incompatible  with growth and the importance of a
good microeconomic  structure - especially  an effective banking system - is
confirmed. The choice of an exchange  rate regime, another of the early controversies,
appears as secondary to the adherence  of a strict monetary policy. The decline of the
state is both spectacular  and puzzling, combining desirable and dangerous features.
Paper  presented at  the  World Bank  Annual  Bank  Conference on  Development
Economics, Washington,  April 28-30, 1999. For very useful comments, I am grateful
to  Dragoslav Avramovic, Richard Portes, Danica Popovic, Boris Vujcic, and my
discussants, Philippe Aghion and Alan Gelb.Introduction:  the political  and intellectual  challenge
When transition started, there was little experience to rely upon. At that time, Latin
America was shifting to market-friendly  policies and East Asia had embarked on its
"miraculous" path of break-neck growth, but the challenge in the former Soviet bloc
was different. These countries had  no markets, almost no  private  businesses, a
monetary and banking system unlike anything seen anywhere else, and they were
simultaneously undergoing a  (sometimes) quiet political revolution. In most cases
productive capital was entirely publicly-owned, opening the way for the  largest
privatization programs ever undertaken, instantly creating from scratch a  class of
corporate moguls.
It  should have been clear, at the outset, that this complex undertaking would not
succeed everywhere, at least not initially. Political conditions differed vastly, affecting
the range of  feasible policies and  the ability to  forge a  sufficient consensus to
undertake unavoidably unsettling changes. In some countries, such as Poland and the
Czech Republic, the new leaders emerged from years of opposition to the communist
regime, they were ready for a sharp change. In others, e.g. Bulgaria, Slovakia and the
former Soviet Union, power was reached by smartly turning coats but old habits were
not discarded. Elsewhere, such in Albania, Hungary or Romania, political turmoil
reflected power-grabbing efforts by various individuals and groups, putting  short-
term political gains ahead of economic consistency.
It was not only politics that mattered, though. Economists sharply diverged too. For
those  who aimed at  a fast  shift to  the market economy mechanisms, Big  Bang
represented a  logically consistent approach. Others aimed  instead at  gradualism:
without denying that the ultimate aim was the establishment of a western economic
system,  they  were  concerned by  the  economic, social  and  political  costs  of
adjustment. Because a day only lasts 24 hours, some sequencing of reforms was
unavoidable.  The  literature  on  sequencing had  been  developed  with  other
experiments in mind, chiefly Latin America, and was ill-designed  for the task. Some
were advocating the pre-eminence of macroeconomic  conditions, others were more
1concerned with establishing early on property rights. The role of banking was also
highly controversial, as shown in the early survey by Pleskovic 1994. Was a well-
functioning credit market indispensable  at the outset, or should the state continue, for
a while, to oversee capital accumulation  while human capital was being accumulated?
While privatization and the setting up of a proper banking system were always seen
by economists as necessary steps, there has been some debate on what kind of market
economy should be aimed at. The US model, where the bulk of corporate financing
originates in stock markets, industrial policy is frowned upon and welfare programs
are limited. The European model accepts social goals and relies to a greater extent on
large banks and the state.
Thus, from the outset, there existed different transition paths and different ultimate
objectives. Along with political conditions and the usual dose of history randomness,
it is not surprising that the outcomes are sharply contrasted. This variety offers us
much to  learn from. Rather than offering fresh evidence and analysis, this paper
surveys the fact and distillates the now voluminous literature on transition to draw a
reasonable set of conclusions. It reviews a territory which has been much visited
recently, e.g. by, Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996, Begg 1996, Blanchard 1997,
Caprio 1995, de Melo, Denizer, Gelb 1996, Pleskovic 1994, and World Bank 1996.
The Broad Facts
Growth
Growth has followed the U-shape shown in Figure 1 which depicts the average of 15
countries, the Central and Eastern economies as well as Russia and Ukraine.'  A
number of economists - chiefly in international organizations  - had been optimistic
and expected a J-shape, expecting that fast growth would set in promptly as soon as
market institutions would be in place. Others - chiefly former east-Europeanists -
2warned of a protracted  L-shape if break-neck  reforms would lead to the instantaneous
obsolescence of previously  accumulated  capital.
Figure I
The length and depth of the initial recession  were not foreseen. As Figure 1 shows, on
average growth has not turned positive until 1994 following a cumulated 29% GDP
decline. The initial output collapse, the object of considerable  controversy, remains a
bit of a mystery. Partly, it reflects the disorganization  that followed  the sudden end of
central planning. The command center was instantly knocked out of order. Firms,
large and small, would have to fend for themselves,  which could mean either adopting
market rules, or asking for  state support, often both simultaneously. In  addition,
international trade within the zone, previously organized by the CMEA, instantly
collapsed.
Figure 2 further shows real  GDP in 1998 (EBRD forecasts) as a percentage of its
1989 level. Only three countries have recovered (Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), in
many others GDP stands at about half of its original level. It has been convincingly
argued by Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 1996b that the data are of poor quality and
underestimate  post-transformation GDP  relative  to  its  pre-transformation level
because output prices have dramatically declined and also because the underground
economy  has  considerably increased. 2 Yet,  the  general  impression  of  a  deep
depression is unlikely to be misleading. The country that recovered fastest, Poland
underwent a  deeper decline early on but  achieved a  much stronger performance
afterwards.  Laggard Russia only briefly returned to positive growth (a paltry 0.8%) in
1997,  but relapsed the following  year.
Figure 2
Inflation
3Most countries started out with massive inflation, in some cases close to, or even
above, Cagan's  standard hyperinflation threshold of  50% per  month. Figure 3
displays the unweighted average inflation rate across the 15 countries of the sample.
The peak of  1992 corresponds to the burst that often followed price liberalization.
Only two  countries, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, managed to  keep inflation in
check,  the  first  one  thanks  to  a  very  careful  approach, the  second  because
liberalization had been allowed at a crawl's pace for the previous decade. Nine of the
sample's fifteen countries reached inflation  rates close to, or above, 1000%. With the
exception of Romania and Russia, inflation is now under control, in the lower double,
or even single, digits.
Of  course,  price  liberalization per  se  cannot  cause inflation. It  is  a  once-off
adjustment.  Its size corresponds  partly to the monetary overhang inherited from goods
shortage that characterized central planning, partly to the initial devaluation when
establishing currency convertibility. It can be amplified by indexation mechanisms
and by expectations  of monetary laxity.
In most cases, the initial burst of inflation was not entirely unwelcome. It eliminated
debts inherited from the central planning period, based on wrong prices and therefore
backed by nearly valueless collateral. Once started, however, inflation tended to
continue  and  often increase. One  reason  was the  belief  in  the  ubiquitous and
misleading theory of inertial inflation,  really a fig leaf really to conceal the monetary
authority's unwillingness to resist ratifying price increases. Another reason was the
emergence of budget deficits in some countries where the central bank had little or no




4Everywhere  in the world, unemployment  figures are problematic.  Because of the often
rudimentary development of the welfare system and of a large underground economy,
the situation in most transition economies is much worse and need to be taken with
great suspicion. The broad outlines of the situation are not  controversial, though.
Figure 4 displays the unweighted average rate of unemployment. Starting from the
near-zero  official  figure  enforced  in  communist  countries,  unemployment
immediately shot up, reaching double-digit figures - European style - within three
years of transition and has remained flat thereafter.
This average pattern conceals much variation among countries.  The Czech Republic is
an  outlier, but some other countries like the Baltic states also managed to  keep
unemployment rates below double-digit  levels. This is also the case in Russia and in
Ukraine, but in these two countries the recorded figures are close to meaningless. 3 The
sharp decrease recorded in Poland after 1993 is atypical.
Figure 4
The evolution of recorded unemployment  is tame in comparison  with the evolution of
output. The result, a dramatic fall in measured productivity, sharply contradicts the
central aim of transformation: boosting productivity. Several factors account for this
pattern.  To  start with,  the  underground economy often represents a  substantial
proportion of official GDP. Unofficial estimates for Russia, for instance, set this
proportion at anywhere between 30% and 50%. Another explanation is that large
firms,  which  were  state-owned, were  reluctant  to  give  up  their  traditional
responsibility of providing life-long jobs, even after they were privatized and chose
instead to seek subsidies  to keep workers  on their payrolls.
Real Wages
The evolution of real wages is shown in Table 1. The base year, when the real wage is
set at 100, corresponds to the beginning of transformation. The evolution is highly
contrasted from one country to another, partly reflecting starting positions. In some
5countries which underwent very high rates of inflation at the time when reform was
enacted, even moderately lagging wages were severely reduced in real terms.
Table 1
Is there a link between unemployment and real wages? Given the number of shocks
that characterize  this period, one would not expect to see a clear relationship. Yet, the
leftmost chart in  Figure 5 suggests a negative relationship, a  supply curve since
unemployment tends to be lowest where real wages are higher (relative to the base
year). The weak link (R2 = 0.  17) suggests that fast reforming countries have both low
unemployment and high wages. However, this conjecture is not  supported by the
rightmost chart which fails to detect any relationship between unemployment and the
EBRD index of liberalization.
Figure 5
Successes  and Failures
Transformation  is primarily about setting sick economies on a catch-up path. Figure 2
shows  that,  on  this  criterion, the  performance has  been  varied  and  mostly
disappointing so far. This does not mean that economic welfare has declined. GDP
used to include goods and services that were not contributing to ordinary citizens'
satisfaction (military goods, services of a repressive state, unwanted or poor quality
goods, etc.). Nor does privatization ensure that the goods now produced are desirable
when subsidies allow firms to keep producing  goods for which there are no takers. 4
Table  2 presents  some rough summary measures of  success: GDP growth rates
(averaged  over  1996-98 to  account  for  possible  hiccups  along  the  way),  the
purchasing power of wages (measured  in US dollars to represent both real wages and
the terms of trade 5) and the percentage of GDP produced by the private sector (an
imprecise gauge of adjustment of output to demand). 6 A country which does well on
one  of these dimensions tends to  do well on the other two  as well (the partial
6correlation of growth with the dollar wage is  0.64, and 0.17 with privatization).
Averaging the three measures (see notes to the table for details) delivers an index of
success shown in the table as Index 1. Index 2 is obtained by dropping privatization.
These admittedly ad hoc indices attempt to formalize casual appraisals.  They both tell
the same story which matches popular perception. A group of countries has clearly
turned the corner. It includes Estonia, Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. The
Czech Republic would have belonged to this group had it not suffered a serious blow
since the May 1997 currency mini-crisis. Croatia, Latvia and Slovenia too are doing
well as  far  as  macroeconomics is  concerned, but  they are lagging in  terms of
privatization. Others have clearly failed so far: Bulgaria (now quickly improving),
Romania, Russia and the Ukraine. Lithuania sits in the middle, mainly because of a
low dollar wage, reflecting adverse initial conditions  rather than the transition itself.
Table 2
Good performance  tends to be achieved in all dimensions, or not at all. It can be that
success breeds success, or that some countries had better starting conditions, or that
some elites are better able to steer transition.
Big Bang or Gradualism?
From the outset of transition, the profession  has been remarkably  divided on the broad
strategy. There was never much doubt about what had to be done: stabilization of
inflation, control over  budget deficits, price  liberalization, adoption of  a  single
exchange rate, current account convertibility,  opening  to trade and capital movements,
building up banking and financial systems, establishing property rights, ending soft-
budget constraints, setting up market-based welfare systems. The question always
was: when to implement these policies?
One view was that moving to markets from a centrally planned economic system can
only  be  done  in  one  go.  Of  course  the  usual  lags  (design,  decision,  and
7implementation) imply that the strategy cannot be enacted literally in one day, but the
proponents of Big Bang insisted that front-loading was highly desirable. On the other
side of the fence, it has been argued that not only it is impossible to do .everything  at
once, but that it is highly undesirable. The gradualists  proposed instead a sequencing
of policy measures.
The Case  for a Big Bang
On the Big Bang side, Lipton and Sachs 1990, Balcerowicz 1994,  Aslund, Boone, and
Johnson 1996, and many others, have presented the following  arguments:'
- Policy complementarity. The alternative to a Big  Bang is  sequencing, but it is
difficult to come up with a logical sequencing. To be fully effective, most measures
need each other. For example, restoring the price mechanism is only useful if firms
face hard budget constraints, which in turns requires clear property rights and the
ability to uphold them. This in turn calls for a separation between firms and the state,
i.e. the end of the planning system and the phasing out of state subsidies. Unprofitable
firms need to be closed down while potentially profitable firms have to find new
sources of financing, which requires the prompt emergence of a financial system.
Since price liberalization frequently leads to a once-off  jump in the price level given
long  accumulated idle  savings, macroeconomic policy has  to  prevent the  price
adjustment from triggering inflation. Necessarily then monetary policy has to  be
shifted to  controlling the money supply, which is impossible unless the budget is
brought under control. In short, to succeed macroeconomic  stabilization  and structural
reforms need each other, and each part strengthens  the whole.
- Policy uncertainty. Given the long  list of  actions to  be  taken, delay  in  their
implementation results in uncertainty and delayed restructuring. The delay may lead
to several forms of inefficiency, even to perverse behavior such as asset stripping by
managers before privatization, lack of investment,  the firing of workers in otherwise
profitable firms, etc. Perverse behavior spreads and gives market economy a bad
8name. If a political backlash occurs before enough irreversibilities  have been created,
the whole transformation  process is in jeopardy.
- Political window of opportunity (Balcerowicz 1994). Whoever happens to rise to
power in the exceptional aftermath of the collapse of communism is endowed with an
unusually  large  stock  of  political capital. The  population  is  willing  to  accept
temporary hardship in the expectation of  rewards to come. Former regime elites are
shaken and  demoralized and  will take time  to  regroup and  mount an  effective
opposition. New interest groups are not yet in existence. It is during that period of
"extraordinary  politics" that reforms can be decided and implemented  most easily.
9The Case for Gradualism
On the  other side  of  the  debate, proponents of  gradualism have produced the
following arguments:
- It takes time to build a new world (Nuti and Portes 1993). It is simply impossible to
enact all measures in a short period of time. Some measures can be quickly put in
place (e.g. macroeconomic  stabilization or price liberalization)  but others require the
accumulation of human capital (establishing banking system or  changing the tax
system), of physical capital (the emergence of a new firms) or the adoption of often
complex legislation (e.g. commercial  laws and courts). Attempting  to do everything at
once  amounts to  doing  first  what  can  be  done  first,  not  necessarily the  best
sequencing. Or worse, trying to move to fast leads to policy mistakes.
- Adjustment costs (Dewatripont and Roland 1992). Rapid changes can be too costly,
even a  threat to  the transition process. The  costs are economic -closing  down
inefficient firms implies an instant destruction of physical and human capital-as  well
as social -the pain of sudden unemployment,  the dislocation  of established patterns of
life. Trying to  force through excessively rapid changes is doomed to  failure and
ultimately destroys the credibility of transformation. In the presence of  costs of
adjustment, there exists an optimum speed of reform which is not a Big Bang. The
power of the argument rests on the identification of empirically relevant adjustment
costs. The list includes the following:
. Workers cannot move instantly from old state-owned  firms to the new private sector
(Aghion and Blanchard 1994).  Job search is always long and costly. Too fast changes
result  in  an  inefficient rise  in  unemployment. The proper  speed  is  to  close or
restructure inefficient firms as new firms emerge and can absorb laid-off workers. A
related argument emphasizes the need to set up a welfare system before allowing
unemployment  to expand.
10. Time inconsistency (Coricelli  and Milesi-Feretti 1993).  In the presence of distortions
- e.g.  wage rigidity  - which  lead the government  to temporarily  intervene  - e.g.  by
subsidizing firms to  limit unemployment - the private sector may adopt perverse
behavior, setting wages even higher. Announcing that there will be no subsidy is not
time consistent if a Big Bang worsens unemployment  to the point where it is deemed
socially excessive. A gradual approach is more compatible with the commitment not
to intervene  with subsidies.
. Costly fluctuations in the real exchange rate (Abel and Bonin 1992). Big Bang
results in deep relative price changes which affect the real exchange rate. This in turn
creates massive uncertainty and  can deter investment in the traded good  sector.
Phasing in reform, instead, allows for small and more predictable price changes.
- Political  costs  (Dewatripont  and  Roland  1992,  Murell  1992).  Economic
transformation  involves winners and losers. Losers are likely to form coalitions which
attempt to block some aspects of the coherent transition process. A Big Bang that
unites coalitions can block reform. Proceeding step by  step makes it possible to
Pareto-compensate  each group of potential losers.
A Look at the Evidence
The debate is not over, although the verdict becomes clearer  and tends to vindicate the
Big Bang school. In fact, the divide is less clear-cut than it initially was believed.
Even the most determined policy-makers had to phase in their Big Bang policies,
while those governments that started slowly soon had to accelerate under pressure
from inflation and mounting resistance by vested interests.  It used to be fashionable to
pit Big Bang Poland against gradualist Hungary. But Poland is a laggard as far as
privatization is concerned while Hungary's bankruptcy law of 1991 led to massive
exits by firms. 8 With hindsight, it is not clear whether Poland, an early boomer which
got tangled along the way, much differs from Hungary, a gradualist which adopted a
number of radical policies. 9
11Key to the debate is the reason for the initial collapse in output and the increase in
unemployment that characterized  the early years of transition. Nuti and Portes 1993,
for example, argue that, absent egregious policy mistakes and save for the CMEA
dismembering shock, GDP should rise, not fall: transformation is about enhancing
productivity from a position well inside the production  possibility frontier. Blanchard
1997 further develops this view. He concludes that output fell for three reasons: 1)
disorganization  as central planning unexpectedly  disappears  in the weak of the sudden
collapse of the Soviet block; 2) the collapse of CMEA which forced a reorientation of
trade; 3) excessively rapid, possibly misguided, policies combined with adjustment
costs played a significant  but small role.
This  debate  is  primarily based  on  circumstantial evidence. A  few  studies  have
attempted to test econometrically for the effect of Big Bang. De Melo, Denizer, and
Gelb 1996, Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 1996b  and Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996 all
conclude that the faster were policies enacted the earlier was the recovery. These
results do not rule out the possibility of early adverse  effects, but they suggest a trade-
off between early costs and longer run benefits. For the CIS countries, Selowsky and
Martin 1997 find a negative short term effect although the longer run effect is positive
but weaker than in central and eastern  Europe.
This  assessment is  borne  out  by  Figure  6  which  uses the  graphical technique
developed by  Fischer,  Sahay, and  Vegh  1996. The  continuous line  shows the
unweighted average real GDP of the 15 countries, with year zero set for each country
on the year when the reform process started (using the dating proposed by Fischer,
Sahay, and V6gh 1996). Real GDP is normalized  at 100 on that same year. The dotted
line does the same but around the year when a macroeconomic  stabilization program
was introduced (using the dating proposed by Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996).
Transition is clearly followed by a fall in GDP, whether reform is adopted or not. On
average recovery occurs in the third year after reform. Importantly, recovery is faster
once macroeconomic  stabilization  is introduced  (be it at the same time as reform, or in
a more gradual way after initial and partial reforms).
12Figure 6
A further confirmation  that fast-moving countries did better than the more gradualist
ones is provided by Figure 7 which shows the profile of GDP around stabilization
year for two subgroups of countries: those that stabilized early in 1990-91 (Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,  and the Slovak Republic) and those that only
implemented a  stabilization program in  1994-95 (Macedonia, Romania,  Russia,
Ukraine).'° The early movers suffered from a  significantly smaller decline before
stabilization. The late movers are slower to  recover and, by  1998, have not  yet
achieved positive growth.  GDP could be more underestimated in slowly reforming
countries, but it is doubtful that the conclusion would be reversed with more accurate
data.
Figure 7
The econometric studies quoted above use of indicators of liberalization developed by
de  Melo, Denizer, and  Gelb 1996. For comparison, Figure 8 uses the  indicator
prepared by the EBRD. This indicator  relies on eight criteria concerning privatization
and enterprise restructuring, markets and financial institutions. The upper graph plots
the 1998 GDP relative to its 1989 level (previously shown in Figure 2) against the
liberalization index. There is a relatively significant  positive relationship (R2 = 0.45).
At the very least, this graph disproves the view that liberalization  is a source of slow
growth a decade after the change in regime. But was it earlier on? The lower chart
repeats the same exercise using the first EBRD indicator published in 1994 and plots
it against 1994 GDPs relative to their 1989 levels. The association is weaker (R2 =




Inflation soared in 1992-93 as Figure 3 above well illustrates." 1 Figure 9, patterned
after Figure 6, shows that the inflation surge occurred at the time when prices were
freed: the peak occurred in the reform year. It also shows that inflation stabilization
often came after several attempts, with partial success followed by a relapse. On the
other side, except for Russia and Bulgaria (the latter explains the blip on year 6 after
stabilization), once it was put to work, stabilization  brought inflation to low two-digit
rates, sometimes even lower.
Figure 9
The inability to operate an economy with high inflation is well-documented. Bruno
and Easterly 1998 have shown that an annual rate of 40% represents a dangerous
threshold. Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 1996 find that the transition countries are no
exception.  One  of  the  least  controversial lessons  seems  to  be  that  inflation
stabilization  was a pre-condition  for the return of growth. This is readily confirmed by
Figure 6 above as well as by Figure 10 which shows that unemployment stops rising
only once stabilization is put in place. The fact that unemployment does not decline
afterwards suggests the possible presence of hysteresis, an issue that does not seem to
have been studied so far. If it were confirmed, it would provide yet another argument
in favor of Big Bang.
Figure 10
Why was inflation allowed to  surge? The causes are standard: excessive money
growth reflecting both large budget deficits and ignorance of basic principles. In the
absence of debt markets and bank lending, any budget deficit had to  be  largely
covered by monetary means. In addition, the monetary nature of inflation was, and
still is in some countries 12, not part of accepted wisdom.
14Big bang, especially its  macroeconomic component, once again appears to  draw
support from the path of inflation. Figure I1, along with Figure 7, indicates that early
movers avoided hyperinflation  which had a devastating  impact elsewhere.
Figure 1  1
Disinflation
Did  macroeconomic policies  aimed at  curbing inflation contribute to  the  early
depression? Figure  3  shows the close relationship between inflation and  budget
deficits. It implies that inflation stabilization  programs had to combine tight monetary
and fiscal policies.
Deficits had opened up for good and bad reasons. Transition economies started with
low income levels but could rationally expect to catch up. Accordingly, individuals
and governments were justified in quickly raising spending on both consumption and
investment goods, private and public. Such deficits represent intertemporal  smoothing
and are not a priori a source of concern. More worrisome is the frequently observed
decline in tax revenues.3 Part of the reason is the end of the old osmosis between the
state and the economy. A reform of both the tax structure and the tax collection
administration is in order but takes times. Here again, as long as steps are taken to
strengthen the tax system, temporary deficits are best seen as an investment. Concern
rises when tax reform is indefinitely postponed (as in  Russia and  Romania, for
instance)  and when inefficient public spending (subsidies to  money-losing firms,
overly generous welfare, etc.) is maintained. In the end, the combination of lower
taxing ability and of an oversized public sector" 4 lead to unwise deficits. These deficits
must be closed anyway. If in addition, bond finance is not possible, eradicating high
inflation requires that public spending be brought down to levels compatible with
declining revenues,  possibly even if this prevents sufficient  intertemporal  smoothing.
There are reasons to doubt that stabilization  exerted a powerful contractionary effect.
Starting  with  monetary  policy,  real  interest  rates  were  typically  raised  from
15(sometimes sharply) negative to positive levels. Yet, outside of former Yugoslavia,
bank loans to producers or consumers were hardly heard of: the standard  channel for a
contractionary effect of monetary policy was simply non-existent. Regarding fiscal
policy, the end of monetary financing of the budget could have a contractionary
impact via the closing of deficits. On the other side, there has been some evidence  that
budgetary stabilization can have expansionary effects. Giavazzi and Pagano  1998
provide some evidence  that this is the case when there is a sharp reduction in deficits
which are seen as clearly unsustainable.  Alesina and Perotti 1995 also finds that fiscal
contractions can be expansionary if they involve a permanent reduction in spending
which implies permanently lower tax liabilities. Alesina and Ardagna 1998 further
find that the expansionary  effect is strengthened  when budget stabilization involves a
political agreement. While these various channels remain to be formally tested in the
case of the transition economies, in addition to the effect detected by Bruno and
Easterly 1998, they provide a plausible interpretation  of the fast turnaround in growth
observed in Figure 6 above.
The Exchange Rate Regime
All varieties of exchange rate regimes have been tried during transition, from the hard
currency boards to  freely floating rates, see Table 3. Fixed exchange rates have
typically been introduced as an anchor at the time of macroeconomic stabilization.
Not  all  countries have  adopted that  strategy, though.  Slovenia and  Latvia,  for
example, successfully eradicated their  own  strains  of  inflation by  focusing  on
monetary targets. Even then the  exchange rate has  been heavily managed, with
Slovenia operating an implicit real exchange rate target. Several questions arise: why
did countries undergoing the same process choose different exchange rate regimes?
Which ones worked better? What differences  did it make?
Because the choice of an exchange regime is always a matter of trade-offs, there is
never a "better" regime. The main lesson of the last 20 years seems that a declared
parity (a fixed exchange rate or a crawling band) is dangerous in the presence of
16capital mobility.' 5 As Table 3 indicates,  the transition countries  have played with these
two policy dimensions over time. Typically, Big Bang countries opted for limited
exchange rate flexibility early on, often with a large dose of current and  capital
account openness. Countries  which were slow in stabilizing  opted for more flexibility
and various restrictions on their current and capital accounts. They often felt that
limiting exchange rate flexibility requires a stock of foreign exchange reserves beyond
reach, while a deep enough devaluation would have been sufficient." 6 There was thus
a virtuous circle involving stabilization, limited exchange rate flexibility and low
inflation, and a vicious circle where runaway inflation and exchange rate flexibility
were  the  consequence of  the  absence of  macroeconomic stabilization. In  some
extreme cases of zero credibility and weak governments, currency boards have been
used not to tempt the devil (Bulgaria and Bosnia).
It is impossible, therefore, to assign a causal role to the exchange regime. The choice
was rather part  and  parcel  of  the  adopted macroeconomic strategy. Still,  early
stabilizers with low or declining inflation have tended to operate for too long the
dangerous mix of limited flexibility and a great degree of capital mobility. The Czech
Republic's crisis of May 1997 worked as a "wake-up call"' 7, soon followed by the
Russian earthquake in August 1998. The message  has been taken on board since, even
though action is slow.' 8
There is no study, yet, attempting to  determine whether any particular exchange
regime has worked better. Most likely, the exchange regime makes little difference by
itself. Two aspects matter here.  The first one is the constraint that it imposes on
monetary policy. Especially when there is  a  large degree of capital mobility, an
exchange rate  commitment, whether explicit or  implicit, leads to  market-based
discipline imposed on the central bank. In countries where central banks are not
independent, or lack public and political support for discipline, this is a  desirable
outcome. What is needed is an exit strategy, the introduction of  some degree of
exchange rate flexibility once capital movements increase in size and become a threat.
Russia is a good example of a country that effectively used the exchange rate anchor
to stabilize inflation but failed to develop a consistent  exit strategy.
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How about the much feared conflict between the anchoring role of the exchange rate
and the need to keep the economy internationally  competitive? Real appreciation has
been massive throughout  the zone, ranging from over 40% in Hungary to nearly 600%
in Lithuania (Table 4). This is partly a catch-up following massive undervaluation  at
the time when exchange rates were unified and allowed to respond to market forces.
The crucial question is whether the real appreciation goes on too far and eventually
results in overvaluation. Trend real appreciation  is to be expected in countries which
are  undergoing deep  restructuring and  fast  productivity growth.' 9 Estimates by
Halpern and Wyplosz 1997, 1998a, Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer 1998, and the EBRD
1998 indicate that, by 1998,  there was no case of overvaluation  yet, even though some
countries are now nearing that  situation. Yet, the issue has  been very  lively  in
domestic  discussions and  weighs on  policy  choices. It  illustrates that  one  key
difficulty of operating a fixed exchange rate regime or a crawling band is that the
exchange rate becomes a political issue.
Table 4
Currency Boards
Currency boards have three main merits: 1) they are robust; 2) as a tight rule, they
establish credibility; 3) inflation becomes endogenous. They also have three main
disadvantages.
First,  a  currency board  eliminates the  ability to  conduct  lender  of  last  resort
operations. Since banking systems are fragile in most transition economies this may
be a serious cost but solutions exist. For example, foreign ownership of banks, as in
Estonia, transfers the responsibility to the bank shareholders. If the country is small,
the cost of bank rescue is well within the means of parent banks. Next, the Treasury
18can accumulate a rescue fund, a solution adopted by Argentina. If either of these two
approaches are adopted, and both have merits, the objection largely disappears.
Second, a currency board prevents the central bank from conducting counter-cyclical
policies, which may result in undesirable output volatility. Small, open and diversified
economies are less sensitive to this problem. In all cases, price and wage flexibility
represents  the best response but one that no government  can control.
Finally, a currency board is widely seen as a temporary arrangement in need for an
exit strategy. For those countries in central and eastern Europe likely to join  soon
enough the European Monetary Union, sticking to a currency board a few years is a
reasonable arrangement, but among them Estonia is the only one that has adopted a
currency board. The others have no reason to enter into one now simply because they
have an exit strategy. For countries further away from accession to the European
Union, or unlikely to ever join, there is no readily available exit strategy. This either
rules out a currency board arrangement  or calls for an eventual "euroization" much as
Argentina has been considering  dollarization.
The budget
Figure 12 shows the evolution of public spending and tax income in 15 countries. As
before, year zero corresponds  to the year when reform started. The figure makes three
points. First, nearly everywhere,  tax collection  has considerably  declined, often before
reform. Disorganization  and a general decline in discipline --or the end of fear of the
state-probably  explain this evolution. 20
Second, public spending has fallen in line with revenues as price subsidies declined in
the wake of price liberalization and as governments struggled to limit deficits. In
many  respects, this  is  not  unwelcome as  central planning  governments  were
oversized. Unfortunately, the spending cuts have often primarily affected investment
and some useful welfare.
19Finally, in a number of countries deficits were already large before reform was put in
place. In those cases, the inherited situation has tended to perpetuate itself. 2" Many of
the  countries which  appear as  unsuccessful in  Table 2  belong to  this  category.
Causality probably runs both ways.
The general impression is that the evolution of budgets again provides an argument
for an early Big Bang. Where tax collection had declined before reform, it has proven
hard to stem the hemorrhage. Similarly, where they were large to start with, deficits
have continued to remain unsustainable.
Figure 12
Banking, Financial Markets and Credit
In contrast to the macroeconomic  aspects discussed  so far, there is much agreement on
the evolution of banking and credit in the transforming countries. This section can
therefore be succinct. The general view (see e.g. Begg 1996, EBRD 1998) is that the
banking system and stock markets are vastly undersized, that they tend to finance
public deficits rather than productive investment and that the robustness of banks is
not satisfactory.
Banks
Banks have been created either from the breakup of the ancient mono-bank, by
transforming existing specialized institutions (e.g. the Soviet Export-Import  Bank), or
from  scratch at  the  initiative of  entrepreneurs or  large  corporations. Naturally,
technical know-how was in  short supply both  in  the new private banks  and  at
regulatory agencies.  The most striking characteristic of "transition banking" is that
banks do very little lending to the private sector, even after taking into account the
stage of development. The only countries where lending to  the private  sector is
20significant (Bulgaria, Croatia and the Czech Republic) are known for the fragility of
their  banking systems and  recently went  through some form  of  banking crisis.
Significant  portions of outstanding credit could be  valueless. Even in countries with
little lending to the private sector, crises are widespread.
Banks are weak and credit undersized for well-known reasons. Until recently, bank
supervision has been poor. In addition, as  long as inflation rates were  high and
variable, bank lending was impossible. With many firms still operating with soft
budget constraints, bank  lending tends to  flow to  inefficient but  well-connected
producers, which eventually results in crises and government  bailouts. Small, dynamic
firms tend to finance their needs through retained earnings (not just  in transition
economies). In some countries, especially in the former Soviet Union, property rights
are ill-defined and loan repayment is far from guaranteed. In most countries, banks
either are saddled with poor loans inherited  from the mono-bank  or have accumulated
poor loans in their start-up  years.
Table 5 shows that banking crises are a familiar occurrence. In some countries open
crises have not occurred only because of continuing state transfers. Bank portfolio
restructuring and recapitalization, often supported with public money,  is a familiar
feature. These interventions have often erred in the wrong direction when balancing
the needs to prevent bank meltdown and the moral hazard costs of support.
Bank lending to the private sector has long been, and sometimes still is, crowded out
by the public sector. This occurs when inflation is too high for Treasury bills to exist
and foreign financing is absent. Once inflation is brought down, Treasury bill markets
develop which,  under  proper conditions, should  allow banks to  diversify their
portfolios. Indeed the share of loans to the public sector, which used to be well in
excess of 60%, has recently fallen sharply in a number of countries (Table 5).
Many loans to the private sector are non-performing.  Officially listed non-performing
loans probably vastly underestimate  the true state of affairs, as was made clear during
the failure in 1998 of a bank in Croatia. In addition, one lesson from the Asian crisis is
21that loans that look safe can sour in no time when a currency crisis occurs, an event
that is certainly not ruled out.
An important very recent change has been the wider opening of banking to foreign
ownership. The numbers reported in  Table 5  may already be outdated for  some
countries. Foreign ownership has been highly beneficial in Latin America. It allows
for recapitalization and transfer of technology.  Not only does it reduce the pressure on
national budgets but it also strengthens  the quality of bank overseeing and regulation.




Most countries were prompt to establish financial markets, as a symbol of moving to a
market economy. Large scale privatization has been instrumental but the markets
remain  small, with  few  securities actively traded outside of Treasury bills. The
generally held view is that it will take years for these markets to become an important
vehicle for corporate financing. There is some debate whether transition countries
should aim at the European model -predominance of bank financing over capital
market financing-or  at the US model (Corbett and Mayer 1991). A more likely
evolution, as witnessed in western Europe, is towards the European model first, and
then to the US model. Evolution here is a question of decades, though, not years.
Foreign Direct Investment
In most countries foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown steadily over the decade.
With the exception of Hungary first, and then the Czech Republic, flows of foreign
capital were long negligible. They started to rise only once reform was in place and
inflation had been stabilized. Even then, FDI does not flow much to some otherwise
successful transition countries such  as Croatia, Slovakia and  Slovenia. In  many
22countries FDI is discouraged by unclear property rights or regulations which keep
foreigners out, especially at the privatization  stage.
As a consequence, total inflows to the 15 countries displayed in Figure 13 reached
only about 1.3% of the region's GDP in 1997, chiefly because the largest countries
(Russia, Ukraine, Poland) retain a low intake. In the smaller countries, the flow of
investment has become quite sizeable, enough to make a difference. When they reach
level of  3 to 5% of GDP, as is often the case, they represent a significant share of
total capital accumulation.  Not all FDIs add to the stock of capital, though. It may
represent the acquisition of existing firms, e.g. in Hungary: even then it frees up
domestic saving for additional accumulation.
Figure 13
Starting in 1994, it was feared that transition countries were about to face disrupting
capital inflows (Calvo, Sahay and Vegh 1994). Previous experience in Latin America
had  shown  that  large  inflows  pose  a  serious  policy  dilemma:  if  they  are
accommodated by  money creation through unsterilized foreign exchange market
interventions,  there is a serious risk of inflation; if the interventions  are sterilized they
quickly become costly as the central bank borrows the domestic currency at a high
interest rate and invests in low-yielding dollar or DM assets. The alternative is to let
the exchange rate appreciate but that strategy threatens international  competitiveness.
This episode contributed to exchange market difficulties in some countries, and to the
1997 currency crisis in the Czech Republic (Begg 1998).
The Role of the State
The size of  government inherited from  central planning was  enormous, so  the
transition economies were expected to spin off a  significant portion of the state's
responsibilities. Figure 14 shows that it has been the case, but only partly so. On
average, the ratio of public spending to GDP has declined from 52.8% in  1989 to
2340.4% in 1997. This still stands above the average OECD ratio of 39.0%. The usual
presumption (Wagner law) that poorer countries have smaller governments does not
seem to apply to the transition countries. Begg and Wyplosz 1999a show that, taking
account of many other economic  and political characteristics,  transition governments
are large by international  standards.
Figure 14
The main,  if  not  the only,  advantage of centrally planned economies was their
extensive welfare system which provided the population with low but highly stable
income from cradle to grave. This is a legacy difficult to shatter, even if it generates
incentives which do not mix well with a market economy. Within a few year all
governments  which had taken power over from the communists  have been voted out
of office, a strong indication that the population was disoriented and generally upset
with rising uncertainty. It may be that the transition countries have to retain, from the
outset, a welfare state that richer countries have progressively built up over decades.
In that case, competitiveness and growth will require low wages to deliver low after-
tax labor costs. Failing to deal with this serious trade-off will lead to Europe-style
high unemployment.
The top panel of Figure 15 shows that the ratio of public consumption  to (a declining)
GDP has remained about stable in many countries. It declined where taxes declined
most. Retrenchment affected  primarily defense spending, by 5 to 9 percent of GDP in
Bulgaria, Hungry, Poland, Russia (where it is still above 10% of GDP) and Romania.
It only rose in Croatia which underwent a war and still feels threatened. Credit to
state-owned enterprises also declined, often substantially (middle panel). The main
item that did not decline much, at least on the basis of data shown in the lower panel
and as a proportion of declining expenditures,.  is transfers and subsidies. Some of
these transfers correspond to welfare, but others are subsidies to declining industries.
The Czech Republic is a case in point; it may help explain why the wunderkind of
transformation  is now mired in a slow-growth  trap.
24Figure 15
Microeconomic  Underpinnings
The emphasis of this paper is on the macroeconomic  aspects of transition. A running
theme is that policies and institutions tend to be mostly right or mostly wrong. The
same applies to the microeconomic  aspects. Table 6 shows the correlation between a
number of  microeconomic transition indicators prepared by  EBRD (averages of
indicators concerning: enterprise restructuring, financial institutions development,
infrastructure, legal and market reforms), two measures of macroeconomic policies
(budget surpluses and inflation over the whole period 1991-98  or the last three years
1996-98), and two measures of economic performance (GDP growth over the whole
period 1991-98 and 1998 GDP as a percent of 1989 GDP).
The  table  suggests  a  number  of  observations. Microeconomic transformation
indicators are positively correlated among themselves, especially those concerning
enterprise restructuring, financial institution development  and market reforms. These
three indicators are also correlated with the macroeconomic  performance indicators
and the growth performance, especially  the budget surplus, with  a further strong link
between inflation over the whole period and market reforns. The table also confirms
that inflation stabilization  is a pre-condition  for growth.
Table 6
Which factors, microeconomic  or macroeconomic,  are more crucial for a successful
transition? The collinearity of the EBRD indicators implies that it is nearly impossible
to  answer the question. Using the two growth indicators as a measure of success,
Table 7 reports cross-country  regressions.  Both the small number of observations (the
same 15 countries studied throughout the paper) and the high degree of collinearity
imposes using very few regressors.
25It is easier to explain performance  over the last three years than over the whole ten-
year period. Inflation stabilization 22 and market institution reforms (which includes
price  liberalization, trade and  foreign exchange systems and competition policy)
emerge as key conditions. Enterprise restructuring  (large and small-scale  privatization
and governance) is less clearly important. Fiscal stabilization is never significant on
its own, which suggests that it matters mostly through its effect on inflation (Figure
3). These results also apply  to the whole period, but they are less precisely estimated.
Table 7
Conclusions
Transition was never going  to  be  easy,  even if  the long-run outlook is  highly
promising. With few spectacular exceptions, most countries are now on the right
track. This section summarizes  the lessons that we have learnt or relearnt, the policy
issues which need to be addressed now, and the many unresolved issues that are on
the research agenda.
Five Useful Lessons
It has paid to start early and move fast. The first lesson is that Big Bang is highly
desirable but impractical,  while gradualism  is unavoidable  but ought to be compressed
as much as possible. Clearly the countries that bit the bullet early and hard are those
that have done better over the last decade.
Stabilize  first, grow next. Macroeconomic  stabilization  is a pre-requisite  for growth, in
the transition countries as elsewhere.  It does not require closing the budget deficit but
severing the link between deficits and money growth is essential.
The importance of structural reform. The third lesson is that microeconomic  policies,
which  have often been overlooked, should be  started as  soon as  possible. This
26includes in particular establishing property rights, hardening all budget constraints,
building up a healthy banking system, and insuring true competition on the domestic
markets. Hungary did so while being too lax on the macroeconomic  side while the
Czech Republic was a model of monetary and fiscal rigor but did not tackle much its
microeconomics:  Hungary is emerging as the top pupil while the Czech Republic is
falling behind.
Irrelevance of the exchange rate regime. The exchange rate regime does not seem to
discriminate much. Like Big Bang vs. gradualism,  the issue of regime may have been
overblown. The floaters have tightly managed their exchange rates while the fixers
have repeatedly devalued and  often ended up  floating. Some form  of  monetary
targeting was needed but, as a first approximation, it matters little which target is
chosen as long as it is adhered  to.
Irreversibilities. Politics  matter more the  less  stable  is  the  economy. Creating
irreversibilities  early on allows for governments  to change without seriously affecting
the transition. A shaky economic basis, on the other side, is fertile ground for policy
reversals  that set the clock back for several years (Bulgaria, Romania, Russia).
Policy Issues
Most of the pending policy issues concern the continuation of structural reforms. Yet
a few macroeconomic  questions remain on the agenda.
Inflation. Inflation has now reached rates between 3% and 15% in most countries.
What is the proper inflation rate for a transition economy? One view is that transition
economies are no different from the others and should aim at a rate between, say, 0%
and 5%. Another view is that a higher rate is desirable for many years to come and has
a limited negative effect (see Table 7). Arguments in favor of moderate inflation are
as follows.
27Even if disinflation has not much affected growth -a  controversial view-further
squeezing a few percentage points is going to be more painful. At this stage in their
history, so the argument goes, the priority for transition countries is to embark on a
robust growth path. This is needed for several reasons: a  much shaken population
needs to  see,  at  great last, the promised benefits; investment to  modernize the
economy requires strong growth prospects; continuing restructuring is bound to be
accompanied by changes of relative prices which is happening more easily when no
price needs to decline in absolute terms; where tax systems are still underdeveloped
the optimal inflation tax cannot be as low as in more mature economies. In addition,
as the fabric of society is being deeply transformed, by allowing relatively painless
redistributive transfers, fast growth "oils" the process.
The exchange rate and capital liberalization.  If inflation is going to be higher than in
the  West,  the  exchange  rate  will  need  to  be  adjusted  to  maintain  external
competitiveness. In  addition, being one  of  the  fast  growth areas of  the  world,
transition countries are likely to face large capital inflows. This raises two issues: the
exchange rate regime and the degree of capital liberalization.
Most countries have introduced some exchange rate flexibility. Yet, large fluctuations
are undesirable for trade integration. Those countries engaged in  accession to the
European Union will face growing pressure to  stabilize one way or another their
exchange rates vis a vis the euro. One solution is to operate a heavily managed float
while limiting capital mobility. Another solution, already in place in three countries,
is to adopt a currency board but most countries will not want to adopt such a radical
strategy.
In many respects, the task of aiming at a stable floating exchange rate is an impossible
one and exchange rate management will remain a permanent challenge. One clear
lesson from the Latin American and Asian crises is that full capital mobility is
undesirable during periods of rapid structural changes. Most transition countries have
retained various restrictions on capital mobility, but fashion and western pressure still
leads them to aim at a rapid liberalization. Such a  strategy ought to  be seriously
28reconsidered. Countries which have fully liberalized  (the Czech Republic and Poland)
will not, and should not, want to fully step back, but Chilean-type  prudential  measures
which aim at lengthening the maturity of capital flows represent a very appealing
transitory measure on the way to European  Monetary Union membership.
Banking.  Over the last couple years, there has been much progress in strengthening
banking systems. Yet, banks are contributing  far too little to the allocation of domestic
resources. Growth financed through retained earnings is a normal strategy for small
firms and may be sufficient in the early years of transition. The next step requires
external financing.
Transition countries might conceivably  jump the banking stage and move on to what
appears as the next stage, stock market financing. This is unlikely, though, and could
even be a dangerous strategy as budding stock markets are far too volatile. This is
why it is urgent to establish a sound banking system. The required steps are well
known, they are spelled out in the Basle accord.
Unemployment.  In barely three years eastern and central Europe has caught up with
western Europe in one sad achievement:  double-digit  unemployment  rates. Hopefully,
much of it is purely a reflection of the extraordinary  depression that marked the first
years  of  transition.  But  there  is  a  serious  risk  of  hysteresis,  that  temporary
unemployment turns into permanent  long-term unemployment. Western Europe has
many lessons to offer. Most of them are "don't": don't let labor markets become rigid
through well-intended but ultimately self-destructing  iegislation and social practices,
beware of a generous welfare state, don't promise quick macroeconomic  policy fixes.
There are also some "does": aim at unemployment  policies which provide incentives
to find a job quickly, encourage labor negotiations  at the firm or plant level.
The research agenda
The experience of transition is rich. It involves a large number of countries which are
often very different but undergo the same basic challenge. As the dust settles, some of
29the early debates fade away but data accumulate  and, at great last, will permit formal
investigations. On the macroeconomic front, a  number of issues deserve special
attention.
Contractionary  stabilization. There is no clear understanding of why the depression
was so deep and of the contribution of various factors. At the same time,  new
evidence is  emerging from  Western Europe that, under  some conditions, fiscal
stabilizations do not have to be contractionary, complementing Cagan's suggestion
that sharp disinflation can be achieved at little or no output costs. Transition countries
which  underwent  massive inflation  and  undertook  deep  stabilizations offer  a
fascinating  field for research.
Desirable inflation. The view that inflation hurts growth when it exceeds a rate of
40%, and maybe much less, is in search for refinements.  It is unlikely that the same
rule applies to each country irrespective of its structure. The transition countries share
a common set of features which may justify a different rule. Progress in this area is
not only interesting per se, it also matters a great deal for policy over the next decade.
Elections. Transition countries did not only go through massive economic changes.
Elections have repeatedly shaken the  political establishment, irrespective of the
incumbent's political colors. The growing literature on the link between policy and
politics can be enriched by the experience accumulated in transition countries. Is it
just the pace of change that explains the short life span of governments, or should we
also look at income redistribution,  the emergence  of interest groups, or the newness of
democracy? Lessons drawn here could be very useful for much of the developing -
and largely undemocratic  - world.
Interest groups. Of particular interest is the rapid emergence, virtually from scratch,
of interest groups of all sorts. In some countries their ability to thwart reforms has
been spectacular. In other countries, governments have been able to deal with them
with some success and to carry on with their policy agenda. The speed and visibility
30of the phenomenon offers a unique opportunity to look into an issue that lies at the
heart of many policy failures around the world.
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34Unemployment  Rate  Average Real Wage
(1998)  (1996-98)
Base year
Albania  11.0  116.1  1992
Bulgaria  10.7  78.3  1991
Croatia  17.5  61.4  1990
Czech  Republic  6.8  175.7  1991
Estonia  4.5  179.9  1992
Hungary  8.9  121.2  1990
Latvia  7.6  149.5  1992
Lithuania  5.6  222.0  1991
Macedonia  41.9  85.7  1990
Poland  9.6  184.8  1990
Romania  8.7  106.5  1990
Russian  Federation  11.5  104.5  1992
Slovak  Republic  13.8  153.0  1991
Slovenia  14.3  131.3  1990
Ukraine  3.9  71.1  1994
Average  9.6  126.1
Sources:  Unemployment:  UN Economic  Commission  for Europe
Real Wage:  EBRD and RECEP (Russia),  Transition Indicator:  EBRD
Note: The real wage is deflated by the producer  price index where available  and set at 100  on
the base year indicated in the last column.
Table 2. Economic  Performance.
Private  GDP growth  Dollar
output  in 1996-98  wage  Index I  Rank I  Index 2  Rank 2
(%GDP)  1998  (overall)  (macro)
1998
Bulgaria  50  -6.9  100  -9.9  13  -5.6  13
Croatia  55  5.1  636  1.9  8  3.4  2
Czech Republic  75  1.4  323  2.9  4  0.2  8
Estonia  70  6.7  257  4.2  3  2.9  4
Hungary  80  3.4  309  5.4  1  1.3  6
Latvia  60  4.2  270  0.0  9  1.5  6
Lithuania  70  4.1  166  2.3  6  1.0  9
Poland  65  6.0  303  2.6  5  2.7  3
Romania  60  -2.5  98  -4.6  11  -3.1  11
Russia  70  -3.0  149  -1.9  10  -3.2  10
Slovak  Republic  75  6.1  272  5.3  2  2.6  5
Slovenia  55  3.6  877  1.1  7  4.1  1
Ukraine  55  -4.4  75  -7.2  12  -4.3  12
Growth.xls - performance
Source: EBRD,  World Bank
Notes:  Index 1 is the weighted average  of the three first columns, each element being
measured relative  to the sample  mean and the weights being the inverse  of the column's
standard deviation.  Index 2 only takes into account the last two columns.Table 3. Exchange  Rate Regimes
Country  Regime  Currency Convertibility
Albania  Managed Float since July 1992  Current  account: mostly free
Capital account: inflows mostly free
outflows  restricted
Bulgaria  Managed Float, Feb. 1991-July  1997  Current  account: mostly free
Currency Board (DM, now [)  since  Capital account: inflows free
1997:07  outflows mostly free
Croatia  Fixed (DM): 1991:12  to 1992:3  Current  account: mostly free
Expected PPP Crawl: 1992:3  to 1993:10  Capital account:  mostly free (in and
Managed float since 1993:10  outflows)
Czech  Fixed (basket) 1990:12- 1997:05  Current account:  mostly free
Republica  Managed Float since 1997:05  Capital account: inflows mostly free
outflows restricted
Estonia  Currency board (DM, now O) since June  Current and capital accounts
1992
Hungary  Adjustable  peg since before 1989b  Current account:  mostly free
Preannounced  crawling band since  Capital account: inflows mostly free
1995:3  outflows restricted
Latvia  Managed float since July 1992  Current and capital accounts
Lithuania  Floating since October 1992.  Current  and capital accounts
Currency Board (US $) since 1994:4.
Macedonia  Managed float since 1992:4  Current account: mostly free
Capital account: restricted
Poland  Fixedc (basket) from 1990:1  to 1991:  10  Current  account: mostly free
Crawling (basket) peg since  then  Capital account:  restricted (in and outflows)
Romania  Managed float since 1992:8  Current  account: mostly free
Unified rate since July 1997  Capital account:  inflows mostly free
outflows mostly freed 1997:07
Russia  Managed float 1991:12-1995:07  Restricted  current and capital accounts
Crawling Peg 1995:07-1998:08
Managed Float since  August 1998
Slovak Republic  Fixedd (basket) since 1990:12  Current account:  mostly free
Capital account: inflows mostly free
outflows restricted
Slovenia  Managed float since 1991:10  Current and capital accounts
Ukraine  Multiple exchange rates until  1996:09  Current  account convertibility since
Crawling peg since 1996:09  1997:04
Restricted  capital  account
Source: Updated from Halpem and Wyplosz  (1997).
Notes:  (a) The Czech Republic is considered as a continuation  of  Czechoslovakia.
(b) Depreciations  occurred in 1989:3  (5%/o),  1989:5  (6%), 1989:12  (10%), 1990:2 (5%),
1991:1 (15%), 1991:11  (5.8%) and then in more frequent smaller installments (3 times and a
total of 5.5% in 1992; 15% in 5 times over 1993;  and 16.8% in 7 times in 1994).
(c) One devaluation (16.8%) in 1992:5.
(d) One devaluation  (10%) in 1993:7.Table 4. Real Exchange  Rate Appreciation
(Percent increase in the Dollar Wage)
Increase from  Year of
Country  trough or first  Trough or first
available data  available data
Bulgaria  65.1  1991
Czech Republic  90.4  1993
Estonia  225.2  1993
Hungary  42.7  1990
Latvia  75.5  1994
Lithuania  558.3  1992
Poland  175.5  1990
Romania  124.8  1990
Russia  201.1  1992
Slovak Republic  61.1  1993
Slovenia  64.0  1991
Ukraine  173.0  1992
Source: Halpern and Wyplosz 1998a
Table 5. Banking and Financial Markets
Number of  Bank  Share of Bank  Stock  Stock market
banks  (Foreign  crisis  Loans to the  Market  Capitalization
owned)  Public Sectora  Started  % of GDP (1997)
1997
Albania  9 (3)  1996-97  93.1  1996  n.a.
Bulgaria  28 (7)  1996  62.7  1992  0.0
Croatia  61 (7)  1998  0.0  1994  22.5
Czech Republic  41 (15)  21.8  1993  30.0
Estonia  12(3)  7.8  1996  25.2
Macedonia  9 (3)  1995  3.8  1996  0.3
Hungary  41 (30)  39.0  1990  36.2
Latvia  32 (15)  1995-96  29.5  1995  11.0
Lithuania  11 (4)  1995  34.9  1992  22.8
Poland  83 (29)  50.8  1991  9.8
Romania  33 (11)  53.0  1995  6.8
Russia  1697 (26)  1998  53.1  1993  29.4
Slovak  25 (9)  40.5  1992  9.7
Republic
Slovenia  34 (4)  30.7  1989  10.9
Ukraine  227 (12)  76.5  1992  6.1
Source: EBRD 1998
Note: (a) 1998 except Albania and Hungary: 1996Table 6. Correlation  Matrix
Microeconomic  Macroeconomic  Outcomes
Budget  surplus  Inflation
Enterprise Financial  Infra-  Legal  Markets  91-98  96-98  91-98  96-98  Growth  GDP
instit.  struct.  96-98  98/89
Enterprise  1.00  0.83  0.57  0.27  0.73  0.59  0.49  -0.53  -0.44  0.65  0.41
Financial  instit.  1.00  0.82  0.47  0.81  0.60  0.53  -0.53  -0.22  0.54  0.38
Infrastructure  1.00  0.66  0.57  0.56  0.44  -0.40  -0.02  0.20  0.15
Legal  1.00  0.36  0.35  0.13  -0.36  0.38  -0.23  0.20
Markets  1.00  0.41  0.23  -0.80  -0.13  0.58  0.65
Budget  balance  1.00  0.89  -0.35  -0.18  0.38  0.41
91-98
Budget  bal.  1.00  -0.05  -0.31  0.41  0.21
96-98
Inflation  91-98  1.00  0.06  -0.54  -0.74
Inflation  96-98  1.00  -0.68  -0.19
Growth96-98  1.00  0.57
GDP  98/89  1.00
Source:  EBRD 1998Table 7. Microeconomic  and Macroeconomic  Effects on Transition  Performance
GDP growth 1996-98  GDP level in 1998 relative to 1989
Market reform  5.64**  5.81**  10.20  34.61*
(2.95)  (3.51)  (0.44)  (1.89)
Enterprise  3.88  5.28*  1.46  12.18
restructuring  (1.92)  (2.69)  (0.15)  (0.82)
Inflation  -0.06*  -0.08**
1991-98  (-2.71)  (-5.96)
Inflation  -0.03**  -0.02**
1996-98  (-7.60)  (-4.05)
Budget surplus  0.86  1.29
1991-98  (0.55)  (0.63)
Budget surplus  0.34  0.14
1996-98  (0.91)  (0.35)
R2 adj.  0.65  0.32  0.55  0.33  0.48  0.36  0.47  0.08
SER  2.50  3.50  2.85  3.45  15.80  17.59  15.97  21.07
Source: see Table 6
Notes: t-statistic in parentheses;  White heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors and
covariances.  **  (*) statistically significant at the 1% (5%) confidence level.Figure  1. Real  GDP
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Throughout  this paper, the sample includes 15 countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,  Lithuania, Macedonia,  Poland,
Romania, Russia, the Slovak republic, Slovenia  and Ukraine. The quality of data is
known to be very poor so the usual caveat has to be massively  taken into account,
without much else possible for the time being.
2It is sometimes argued that PPP-adjusted  measures  of GDP are better indicators. It
depends what one wants to measure.  Given the trend real appreciation  characteristic of
the transition process documented  in Halpem and Wyplosz (1997),  using PPP-
adjusted GDP will make a significant  difference  and show more growth. Here,
however, the focus is on the quantity of output, hence the use of non PPP-adjusted
GDP. More troublesome is the underground  economy  which is presumed  to have
grown significantly  faster than the officially recorded GDP, and which may now
account for 20 to 35% of total output. Some estimates  can be found in Lack6 (1999).
3 In most of the former Soviet Union workers often remain attached  to firms even
though they hardly work and get paid with great delays, and often in kind.
4 Privatization,  and in particular the method chosen to carry mass privatization,  is a
crucial issue. The literature is too vast to be surveyed here.
5 Looking at 1998 dollar wages overlooks  the initial conditions. On the other side,
initially most transition countries underwent  dramatic  currency depreciations  so that
the starting value of the dollar wage is not informative.  Eventually, success means
OECD-level  dollar wages.
6 This sample is narrower than the one used so far as data lack for Albania, Croatia
and Macedonia.
7 The Big Bang approach has often been dubbed, mostly by its opponents,  "shock
therapy". Balcerowicz 1994 explains in detail how the connotation  of this expression
is both misleading and a crude but efficient way of making it look unreasonable.
8An important issue is the privatization  method, and the contrast between voucher
privatization  as in Poland and cash sales, including to foreigners,  as in Hungary. There
is a large literature on this issue which is beyond the scope of this paper. The point
made here is different: it concerns  the exit of state-owned firms. State-owned  firms
need not all be inefficient so the Hungarian-type  sweeping  bankruptcy procedure may
have wrongly eliminated some firms and destroyed  useful capital. Against this risk
lies the risk of engaging in subsidization (with the risk of an ever-growing  number of
claimants) which is then hard to roll back as the case of the Czech Republic illustrates,
as well as the political implications of maintaining the influence  of the industry-based
nomenklatura,  as illustrated  by the cases of Russia and Ukraine.For an interpretation  of the Hungarian experience  along  these lines, see Halpem and
Wyplosz 1998b. For an argument  that the distinction  between Big Bang and
gradualism can be overblown, see Portes (1994).
10 Bulgaria is a special case. It first stabilization  program foundered  and it enacted a
second, more radical, program in 1997.  Lacking any better criterion, each country is
listed according to the year of its first stabilization  program.
" The figure does not include Yugoslavia  which underwent  what is possibly the
highest hyperinflation since  the postwar period. Unfortunately  data on this episode
are not easily available due to the boycott.
12 For instance, there is still a lively debate in Russia on whether inflation is related to
money or to "structural factors" such as the presence of monopolies  or the decline in
output which is seen as a source of excess demand.
3 This phenomenon is documented  and interpreted  in Belanger et al. (1994).
14 For an attempt at determining  whether public spending is excessive in the transition
countries, see Begg and Wyplosz 1999a.
5 See, for example, Eichengreen 1999,  Wyplosz 1998.
16 Begg 1996 convincingly  argue that exchange rate pegging is impossible  unless the
budget deficit has been previously  brought under control.
7 I owe this expression to Miroslav Hrncir from the Czech National Bank.
18 These points are developed in Begg and Wyplosz 1999b.
19 One reason is the traditional Balassa-Samuelson  effect. Yet this does not seem to
apply well to the transition economies.  For an altemative theory, see Grafe and
Wyplosz (1999).
20 The data are for the general budget. In Russia, they fail to reveal the dramatic
decline in tax revenues suffered by the Federal govermnent because most regional
authorities have been able to uphold, and often improve, tax collection at the expense
of the central budget. The decline in federal tax revenues  lies directly at the roots of
the 1998 exchange crisis, see Ivanova and Wyplosz 1998.
21 Hungary stands apart as having allowed its deficit to grow after reformn.
22 An inflation  rate of 100% cuts average annual growth by 3 percentage points.Policy  Research  Working  Papei  ,  s
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